S-money: virtual tokens for a relativistic economy by Kent, Adrian
S-money: virtual tokens for a relativistic economy
Adrian Kent
Centre for Quantum Information and Foundations, DAMTP, Centre for Mathematical Sciences,
University of Cambridge, Wilberforce Road, Cambridge, CB3 0WA, U.K. and
Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, 31 Caroline Street North, Waterloo, ON N2L 2Y5, Canada.
(Dated: February 8, 2019)
We propose definitions and implementations of “S-money” – virtual tokens designed for high value fast trans-
actions on networks with relativistic or other trusted signalling constraints, defined by inputs that in general are
made at many network points, some or all of which may be space-like separated. We argue that one significant
way of characterising types of money in space-time is via the “summoning” tasks they can solve: that is, how
flexibly the money can be propagated to a desired space-time point in response to relevant information received
at various space-time points. We show that S-money is more flexible than standard quantum or classical money
in the sense that it can solve deterministic summoning tasks that they cannot. It requires the issuer and user
to have networks of agents with classical data storage and communication, but no long term quantum state
storage, and is feasible with current technology. User privacy can be incorporated by secure bit commitment
and zero knowledge proof protocols. The level of privacy feasible in given scenarios depends on efficiency and
composable security questions that remain to be systematically addressed.
INTRODUCTION
Money, share certificates, passwords and other tokens are familiar quantities whose definitions nonetheless continue to evolve.
For example, our conceptions of the function and physical form of money were expanded by the inventions of cryptocurrencies
(see e.g. Ref. [1]) and Wiesner’s quantum money [2] respectively.
Here we reconsider money and tokens from another perspective, in which they are used on a network of points in space-time
with a causal structure enforced by trusted constraints. Our primary motivation is that relativistic signalling constraints imply a
causal structure that plays a significant and growing role in the global economy. Since general relativistic corrections in weak
gravitational fields are small, the background space-time around Earth is well approximated by Minkowski space. We take
networks in Minkowski space, without any further signalling constraints, as our main illustration; thus we write P ≺ Q if P lies
in the past light cone of Q, and P  Q if either P ≺ Q or P = Q.
However, our discussion applies to any fixed background space-time, so general relativistic corrections can also be included
where significant. Our discussion also applies to network causal structures defined by additional constraints arising from trusted
technological limitations. For example, one or both parties might accept that the other cannot practically communicate at or
near light speed through the interior of the Earth, even though physics gives several ways to do this in principle. For parties
who cannot communicate through the Earth’s interior at speeds greater than 2cpi , the fastest signals between points on the Earth’s
surface travel at light speed on a great circle. Parties might additionally trust lower than light speed signalling bounds, enforced
by specific features of a given network. In this context P ≺ Q means that the parties agree that both can signal from P to Q.
The light speed bound on communications plays a significant role in the global financial system and some of its implications
for arbitrage are well known. However, the broader financial implications of special relativity have received little attention, with
the notably amusing exception of Krugman’s analysis of interstellar interest rates [3].
We identify two problems that are intrinsic to trades on networks with trusted signalling constraints when transaction speed is
critical. The first is preventing illegitimate duplication without incurring the transaction delays required in order to cross-check
across the network. The second is allowing the location of token presentation to depend as flexibly as possible on incoming
data across the network, so that the token user can effectively allow the token to “materialise” at a particular space-time point in
response to relevant events and incoming information.
We propose a solution in the form of “S-money” schemes defining virtual tokens, of a type we describe below. The S may stand
for “super” in contexts where our schemes have potentially critical advantages over other types of money. As we explain below,
when used by parties with distributed networks of agents in space-time, these advantages can include practicality (compared to
quantum money with current technology) and flexibility of response to incoming data (when compared to all previously defined
types of money, as far as we are aware).
One natural way of investigating this flexibility is via generalised summoning tasks. Summoning was originally [4, 5] con-
sidered as a way of studying the properties of quantum information in space-time. In that context, it is defined as a task between
two mistrustful parties, Alice and Bob, who each have networks of collaborating agents. Bob creates a quantum state, keeping
its classical description secret, and gives it to Alice at some starting point. Alice is required to return it at some later point that
depends on communications received from Bob at other points. Various versions of the task have been studied [4–8]. Here we
go beyond the original context and definitions, and think of summoning tasks more generally as tasks in which Alice wishes
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2for something to become available at some specific space-time point that depends on data that her agents may have received at
various points in space-time. In our case, it is a valid virtual S-money token that becomes available for presentation at a specific
space-time point on a network, which depends on market or other data Alice’s distributed agents received at various network
space-time points. In this context, the “S” may alternatively stand for “summonable”. For those unfamiliar with summoning, it
is worth stressing that – in either context – many more tasks are solvable than initial intuition might suggest. In particular, many
summoning tasks are solvable even though they cannot be solved by making the quantum state or virtual token follow some
definite path through space-time.
We show that S-money is more flexible than standard quantum or classical money, in the sense that it can solve any de-
terministic summoning task that they can without requiring the same resources, and many that they cannot. Without an extra
cryptographic layer, S-money does not protect the user’s privacy: the issuer can read the user’s inputs as soon as they are pro-
vided. However, we show that bit commitments and related cryptographic protocols may be used to effectively encrypt these
inputs and retain user privacy.
In summary, our aim here is to introduce and explore the conceptual framework of S-money and show that it has some
significant advantages in specific contexts. Other types of money also have major advantages, which are not replicated by
the types of S-money described here. It may well be possible to improve S-money further and/or to devise hybrid schemes
that combine some or all of the advantages of S-money and of other types. We hope researchers will begin addressing these
questions; we discuss some of the relevant issues later.
The two problems S-money addresses are not new in principle. Indeed, in one sense they were larger in past, given the low
technological bounds on signalling speeds before the development of the telegraph and radio.[32] The relatively undeveloped
state of the pre-1830s global financial system, computing technology and cryptography presumably help to explain the lack of
historical precedents.
NETWORKS AND AGENTS
We are interested in token schemes that allow some form of access – for example to goods, services, data, physical objects
or environments. Depending on the context, such tokens might for example play the role of money, passwords, keys or pass-
cards. They may be used by parties with many possible relationships. The parties may be individuals or may be networks of
collaborating agents who trust one another.
For illustration, we suppose that the scheme involves money issued by one agency, B (Bob, the Bank, or issuer) to another
A (Alice, the Acquirer, or user). We suppose that A and B have pre-equipped themselves to carry out communications and
transactions at a pre-agreed finite set of space-time points defining a network.
A network point P here represents a small pre-agreed local space-time region around the point P , which can contain separate
secure sites for user and issuer agents, and authenticated classical and/or quantum channels between these sites. All communi-
cations associated with a given network point must take place within the associated space-time region. Typically, when there is
a natural fixed frame choice to describe the network, we assume that the spatial diameter of these regions is significantly smaller
than the spatial separation between any pair of network points.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume below that the only signalling constraint is the impossibility of superluminal communi-
cation, and that both A and B can send secure classical signals (for instance using one-time pads maintained by quantum key
distribution) from any network point to any other network point within its future light cone.
As usual in relativistic cryptography [9], we assume that each agency may be represented by a set of agents who are completely
trusted and whose actions are coordinated, so that they can be identified as effectively a single party. The parties may have
unequal technological resources. We suppose that B plays the role of a universal bank, and has an agent available at each
network point; the same agent may be available at many timelike separated points. A may be a single user or small organisation,
with only one or a few agents, moving between network points, perhaps in response to locally acquired data. Alternatively, she
may be an organisation similar to B, with agents available at every network point.
Authentication
We assume that at each network site user and issuer agents are able to authenticate each other’s communications. This may
be by physical means or by using some standard cryptographic authentication scheme, or a combination. The authentication is
of the issuer and user rather than of individual agents. Each issuer agent is able to verify that a communication came from the
user, and vice versa. They do not necessarily need to be able to verify that the communication came from a specific agent of
the other party, nor do they need to authenticate the location of that party. It is sufficient for our schemes that a party receives
authenticated communications from the other at particular space-time points.
3We also assume that all user agents have secure authenticated communication channels with one another and that the same
applies to all issuer agents. Since we assume perfect trust among user agents, the user agents may simply identify themselves
and their locations in these communications, if required; similarly for communications among issuer agents.
THE PROBLEM OF DUPLICATION
Classical data money in space-time
Consider first a simple money scheme based on classical data strings. (Essentially the same scheme, though without the
relativistic network context, was discussed by Gavinsky [10].) To issue a money token, B generates a secure random string S at
some point P0 and transmits it securely to A at some network point P  P0. The string has an agreed monetary value V (S).
B’s agent at some point P1, where P0  P1  P , securely communicates the values (S, V (S)) to all B’s agents in the future
light cone of P . A’s agent at P may securely carry the string S to some network point Q  P , or securely transmit it to another
agent of A at such a point. Here we write Q  P if and only if Q is in the causal future of P . After some sequence of such
actions, A’s agent at a network point Z  . . .  Q  P may present the string to B’s agent at Z, who checks against his
records, validates it, and issues resources to the value V (S). Having done so, he communicates the fact to all B’s agents in the
future light cone of Z, ensuring that they will not accept the string if it is re-presented to them.
Among other problems, this scheme is vulnerable to illegitimate multiple presentations of the same token. Once A receives
the string S, she may copy it and transmit it to agents at two or more pairwise space-like separated network points Z,Z ′, . . .,
who may present it to B’s agents at each of these points. None of B’s agents at these points can be aware that the string is
also being presented at the other points. If they follow the scheme as defined, they thus each issue resources to the value V (S),
allowing A illegitimate access to multiple resources.
Detection of fraud
B’s agents will communicate their acceptance to one another, so that B will eventually become aware of A’s fraud. Legal
and/or other sanctions may follow. These may be a sufficient deterrent in some scenarios, but not all. Fraudulent transactions
may be difficult to reverse, particularly if A’s agents exploit, consume, abscond with or trade on resources. The legal situation
may be complex; each agent of A may claim that they behaved honestly, unaware of the others’ actions. If A’s motive is, say,
sabotage of a financial system, she may not be overly concerned about detection.
Cross-checking and delays
For these reasons, among others, B may want to make the scheme secure against multiple presentation. One possible security
mechanism is for any agent of B who receives the money token to cross-check with all other agents of B (either individually
or via a central server) and make sure they are aware he has received the token, and have not themselves previously received it,
before he issues the resources. If access delays of the order of twice the network diameter are acceptable, this may be a viable
solution. For global markets with superfast local trading responding to local data, let alone future interplanetary and interstellar
markets, it will not be.
PREVENTING DUPLICATION WITHOUT CROSS-CHECKING
We now consider a simple alternative proposal, fixed path classical data money. This can be thought of as a special case of
the S-money schemes we define below. Like general S-money schemes, it prevents illegitimate duplication. However it lacks
the flexibility of general S-money schemes.
Fixed Path Classical Data Money
We define fixed path classical data money to be classical data money with an extra condition on the user, A, that ensures that
the money token follows a single path through the network. When A’s agent at P receives the string S, she is required to tell
4B’s agent there at which point Q  P she wants the token to be valid. B’s agent at P communicates this to B’s agent at Q, who
will only accept the token as valid if he has received this confirmation.
If A’s agent at Q wants to propagate the money token further, then she does not present the string to B’s agent there, but tells
him at which point R  Q she wants it to be valid. B’s agent at Q communicates this to B’s agent at R, along with confirmation
that he received a communication from the agent at P confirming that the token propagated from P to Q. The agent at R will
only accept the token as valid if he has received these confirmations.
This continues until the token is presented by A’s agent at Z to B’s agent at Z. He checks that S is the correct string and
that B’s agents at P,Q,R . . . have confirmed that the token was validly propagated from P → Q, Q → R, and so on. A thus
cannot validate the token at two spacelike separated points Z,Z ′, since there cannot be two distinct valid propagation paths
P → . . .→ Z and P → . . .→ Z ′.
space
time P
Q
R
Z
Z’
FIG. 1: Schematic description of fixed path classical data money.
Drawbacks of Fixed Path Classical Data Money
Clearly, in this scheme,B knows ahead of time where the money token will be valid, so that the user’s privacy is compromised.
This can be addressed. We describe later ways in which fixed path classical data money, and the more general S-money schemes
we consider below, can be extended to ensure A’s privacy below.
Another concern may be that the scheme reduces A’s flexibility. In a general network, A’s agent at P may not know at
that point which site the token should go to next, and may wish to decide later. In principle, this concern can be significantly
mitigated by refining the network to include more decision points. If the token were a physical object (which may be massless
and travel at light speed) being propagated by A, then at any given point P the user A would know the token’s current planned
trajectory and hence, to good approximation, a near future space-time pointQ it will reach. A sufficiently refined network would
allow her to propagate the token from P to Q, reevaluate the trajectory there, and so continue. If one thinks of the user as an
individual moving about the planet carrying a physical token, for example, then in principle our scheme can emulate this if the
user carries a mobile device exchanging signals with issuer’s local stations, which can calculate her velocity at any given point
and propagate the token to an appropriate future network point.[33] Similarly, our scheme can emulate a data token sent at light
speed over a user’s network, by taking switching points to be points of the scheme’s network and propagating our token between
switching points according to the scheme.
A less obvious drawback is that, as the name implies, fixed path classical data money tokens follow a definite path through
space-time. We now argue that relativistic or other signalling constraints motivate a more general concept of money token, which
does not require definite token paths.
MONEY AS A SOLUTION TO TASKS IN SPACE-TIME
Money and information
We start by proposing a way of thinking about money and other tokens in general, whether or not signalling constraints apply.
This is to consider money and tokens as solutions to problems that arise because the information users receive over time is
significant for their decisions and generally unpredictable in advance. Money and tokens allow users (qua consumers) to acquire
5or access resources, and (qua producers) to sell or allow access to resources, when they receive information that tells them this
is possible and advantageous. If we had perfect advance information, we could pre-arrange every transaction that we will wish
to carry out during every trip, and leave our wallets at home. We could even pre-arrange a set of contracts at birth, committing
ourselves to a lifetime of balanced production and consumption, signing off on the payment for the choir at our funeral before
exploring our crib. In fact, we don’t know how we or the world will evolve, and so we don’t know what we will want, nor
what the world will want from or offer us. So we generally carry some form of money, in order to buy or sell when relevant
information arrives.
Relativistic and other signalling constraints impose limits on when and where specific information can arrive. For everyday
decisions, relativistic constraints are currently rarely relevant. Lemon prices in Australia rarely fluctuate fast enough to affect
whether a consumer in the U.K. should buy lemonade, however precise her decision calculus and however avidly she tracks the
global lemon market. For high-frequency financial market trades and other trades involving relativistic arbitrage, though, they
are crucial.
Even when relevant, relativistic constraints do not fundamentally change the role of money for individuals, so long as they act
only as individuals. If someone follows a definite path in space-time, and makes all their financial decisions themselves, during
that path, their decisions at any point on the path are made only on the basis of information that has reached them up to that point
on the path. This is true in either Galilean or Minkowski space-time.
However, this no longer holds true in Minkowski space-time when individuals act as agents of a larger enterprise. A team of
separated collaborating agents each acquire information on their own paths. The team thus may receive information at various
points distributed throughout space-time, which may be shared as fast as signalling constraints allow. This shared information
may make a persuasive case for buying or selling at various other points in space-time. For money to enable buying or selling, it
needs to be available at the relevant points. So a money token scheme needs to solve the problem of responding to information
distributed throughout space-time, by making money available at appropriate points, while preventing illegitimate duplication.
A team of user agents who have only one money token, which they propagate along a definite causal path, only has the option
of using it at points on that path. The present state of such a token is defined at any given time in an agreed frame (or more
generally on any given hypersurface) by its location. The evolution of its future state is determined by its velocity and higher
derivatives. These can only be affected by information in the past light cone of its present location. For this reason, fixed path
classical data money and other schemes that require money tokens to follow definite paths in space-time do not allow optimally
flexible responses to incoming information distributed over space-time, as the examples below illustrate.
A model environment for money token schemes
We define a model environment for money tokens in which local user agents may acquire new information at specific points in
space-time and agents collaborate on decisions to acquire or access resources. We will assume here that the relevant information
and resources are classical.[34] User agents at some set of input points {Pi}mi=1 receive incoming classical information, which
may for example be integers ni, real numbers xi or real vectors xi. We also allow the possibility that the user agents at some or
all of the Pi receive no information.
The user agents collaborate in order to optimize their decisions about acquiring a local resource at some presentation point Q.
There is a finite set {Qi}ni=1 of allowed presentation points. The user agents’ collective decisions may either select one of the
Qi or select none of them, in which case they effectively choose not to acquire the resource. We suppose that the sets {Pi} and
{Qi} are known well in advance. They may overlap: the user agents at some or all of the Qi may receive incoming classical
information relevant to their choice of Q.
For example, the global financial network defines market prices at many different market locations at any given time, and
these may be available to local user agents in real time. These prices in turn are determined in response to locally acquired
information, which may for example include revealed actions of market participants or independent actors, physical events, and
the outcomes of local computations. Users may wish to use information from many points in space-time to inform their decisions
about acquiring a local resource at some given point Q.
DEFINING S-MONEY
S-money schemes define virtual tokens that allow users to solve generalised summoning tasks defined by incoming infor-
mation distributed over a space-time network. In schemes where the user has a free choice of the valid presentation point,
these tokens are generated, according to pre-agreed rules, by inputs from the user at various network points, generally including
space-like separated points. In schemes where the user and issuer jointly determine the valid presentation point, the tokens are
generated by such inputs from both parties.
6User privacy is not essential to solve such tasks, and so we may define unencrypted S-money schemes, in which the user keeps
nothing private from the issuer. In these schemes, the issuer’s agents learn the user’s agents inputs immediately, and the issuer
may be able to predict in advance where the virtual token will be presented. We later discuss versions of the schemes that use
cryptography to preserve user privacy.
The definitions of S-money schemes given below are quite general. For example, unless we insist on instant verification by
both user and issuer as part of the definition rather than a desirable feature attainable in many interesting examples, they include
schemes that require cross-checking by the issuer of the type described above. If we were to insist on instant verification by both
user and issuer as part of the definition, then we would exclude potentially interesting S-money schemes that may require some
short delay for checks without requiring full cross-checking across the network. We prefer to leave the definitions general (so
that some S-money schemes have no evident advantage) and illustrate their scope with examples where advantages are evident.
S-money with free user choice of the presentation point
We are interested in schemes that allow virtual tokens to be generated and presented with some or all of the following
properties:
(i) (free user choice) the user may present a valid token at one of a number of pre-agreed space-time points, some or all of
which may be space-like separated. The identity of the point at which the token is valid depends solely on data that the
user’s agents input into the token scheme.
(ii) (instant verification by issuer) the issuer may verify at any such pre-agreed point Q whether the token is valid at Q.
(iii) (instant verification by user) the user may verify at any such pre-agreed point Q whether the token is valid at Q.
(iv) (security against duplication) the scheme guarantees to the issuer that valid tokens cannot be presented at two or more
points.
Of these, (iv) is crucial. A valid token must eventually be verified by the issuer, even if the scheme does not satisfy (ii),
and so multiple valid tokens implies multiple spending. Properties (ii) and (iii) can be relaxed somewhat – for example by
allowing verification delays that are short compared to the network diameter – while still allowing schemes that are advantageous
compared to cross-checking schemes. The cases where property (i) holds or not are independently interesting, as we discuss
below. The various schemes we describe below all satisfy (ii)-(iv).
We now give general definitions of S-money token schemes. They can be used on a very broad class of networks. In general
they define tokens that are not required to follow definite paths in space-time.
The first definition below describes the simplest versions of these schemes, which have free user choice, instant verification
by issuer and user and security against duplication. It is illustrated in our discussions below of classical emulation of summoning
quantum money and of Examples 1 and 2.
S-money (with free user choice and optimal issuer and user communication)
(i) user agents at each network point Pi in an agreed set {P1, . . . , Pn} communicate to the corresponding issuer agent at
Pi classical information encoding statements of some pre-agreed form.[35] These statements collectively constrain the
network points Q at which the token may potentially be valid.
(ii) The issuer agents at each Pi communicate the statements they received to all issuer agents at points Q  Pi.
(iii) The user agents at each Pi communicate the statements they transmitted to all user agents at points Q  Pi.
(iv) The token is valid at a network point Q, and should be accepted by the issuer’s agent at Q if presented there, if and only
if the statements communicated to the issuer and user agents at Q imply that (i) the token is potentially valid at Q, (ii) the
statements received by issuer and user agents at any network point R spacelike separated from Q exclude the possibility
that the token is also potentially valid at R.
(v) if a valid token is presented and accepted at Q, B’s agent there communicates this to all B’s agents at points Q′  Q, so
it will not be accepted again at any such Q′. Similarly A’s agent communicates this to all A’s agents at point Q′  Q, so
that they are aware that it will not be accepted again at any such Q′.
7Note that conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) all describe communications that are relevant in applying condition (iv).
Conditions (i) and (iv) give separate definitions of potentially valid and actually valid tokens, which are convenient in under-
standing some of the examples we discuss. These definitions can alternatively be combined, so that a token is valid at Q if the
set of statements received at Q belong to a list of valid sets. In this case, every valid set of statements must have the property that
they exclude the possibility of a valid set of statements being received at any pointR spacelike separated fromQ. The analogous
definitions for the other types of S-money discussed below can similarly be combined.
Conditions (ii), (iii) and (v) ensure that each issuer (respectively user) agent communicates all relevant information to all
issuer (respectively user) agents in his (her) causal future. These are useful but not essential simplifying features. We may
instead allow the issuer and user agents to follow agreed weaker rules, with the tradeoffs that the criteria for token validity are
more stringent and that instant user verification may not be possible, as follows.
S-money (with free user choice, without optimal issuer and user communication):
(i) user agents at each network point Pi in an agreed set {P1, . . . , Pn} communicate to the corresponding issuer agent at Pi
classical information encoding statements of some pre-agreed form. These statements collectively constrain the network
points Q at which the token may potentially be valid.
(ii) The issuer agents at each Pi communicate the statements they receive to some subset Si of the issuer agents at points
Q  Pi. The subsets Si are known to both parties in advance of the protocol.
(iii) The user agents at each Pi communicate the statements they transmitted to some subset Ti of the user agents at points
Q  Pi.
(iv) The token is valid, and should be accepted by the issuer’s agent at a network point Q if presented there, if and only if the
statements communicated to Q imply that (i) the token is potentially valid at Q, (ii) the statements received by the issuer
agent at every network point R 6= Q exclude the possibility that the token is also potentially valid at R.
(v) If a valid token is presented and accepted at Q, B’s agent there communicates this to some subset SQ of B’s agents
at points Q′  Q. The subsets SQ are known to both parties in advance of the protocol. Similarly A’s agent there
communicates this to some subset TQ of A’s agents at points Q′  Q.
Note that conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) all describe communications that are relevant in applying condition (iv).
The subsets in condition (ii) and (v) are allowed to be the empty set or the full set of all points in the causal future of Pi and
Q respectively. Of course, if every subset is the full set of all points in the causal future of the relevant point, this becomes a
S-money scheme with optimal issuer and user communication. Schemes without optimal issuer and user communication are
defined to allow instant verification by the issuer. A sufficient condition to ensure instant verification by the user is that the
subsets satisfy Si ⊆ Ti for all i and SQ ⊆ TQ for all Q. In schemes without instant verification by the user, it may sometimes
be the case that the issuer would accept the token as valid at some presentation points, but the user does not know this at the
relevant points.
For simplicity, we focus on schemes with optimal issuer and user communication in the examples below.
S-money with valid presentation points jointly determined by user and issuer
We are also interested in S-money token schemes in which both the user and issuer input data into the scheme, such that the
identity of the point at which the token is valid is a joint function of user and issuer inputs. By definition, such schemes do
not have free user choice. Examples 3 and 4 illustrate such schemes, in which the user and issuer jointly determine the point at
which the token is valid. We give a general definition of these schemes, assuming optimal issuer and user communication.
S-money (without free user choice, with optimal issuer and user communication)
(i) user agents at each network point Pi in an agreed set {P1, . . . , Pn} communicate to the corresponding issuer agent at
Pi classical information encoding statements of some pre-agreed form. Issuer agents at each Pi also communicate to
the corresponding user agent at Pi classical information encoding statements of some pre-agreed form. The issuer may
be required to respect pre-agreed constraints relating their statements.[36] These statements collectively constrain the
network points Q at which the token may potentially be valid.
(ii) The issuer agents at each Pi communicate the statements they sent and received to all issuer agents at points Q  Pi. The
user agents at each Pi likewise communicate the statements they sent and received to all user agents at points Q  Pi.
8(iii) The token is valid at a network point Q, and should be accepted by the issuer’s agent at Q if presented there, if and only
if the statements communicated to the issuer and user agents at Q imply that (i) the token is potentially valid at Q, (ii) the
statements received by issuer and user agents at any network point R spacelike separated from Q exclude the possibility
that the token is also potentially valid at R, assuming that the issuer has respected the pre-agreed constraints relating their
statements.
(iv) If a valid token is presented and accepted at Q, B’s agent there communicates this to all B’s agents at points Q′  Q,
so it will not be accepted again at any such Q′. Similarly, A’s agent there communicates this to all A’s agents at points
Q′  Q.
Note that conditions (i), (ii), and (iv) all describe communications that are relevant in applying condition (iii).
As before, the assumption of optimal communications is made to simplify the scheme, but is not essential. We may instead
allow the issuer and/or user agents to follow agreed weaker rules, with the tradeoffs that the criteria for token validity are more
stringent and that instant user verification may not be possible. The definition of schemes without optimal user and issuer
communication parallels that given above for schemes with free user choice.
The definition allows the possibility of pre-agreed constraints relating the issuer’s inputs, which a dishonest issuer may violate,
but does not allow a similar possibility for the user. This makes sense in asymmetric scenarios in which the reputational costs to
a cheating issuer are higher than those to a cheating user, and the potential consequences of user cheating are more serious. Of
course, if users perceive the risks or costs of issuer cheating as too high, they may prefer schemes in which the issuer’s inputs
are not required to be related. We discuss these points further in Examples 3 and 4 below.
EXAMPLE: EMULATING QUANTUM MONEY WITH S-MONEY
Advantages of quantum money in relativistic scenarios
Wiesner’s quantum money [2] uses quantum information embedded within a physical token as a security mechanism. One
well understood property of quantum money is its effective unforgeability [2, 11]. This unforgeability also holds for other
versions of quantum money [10, 12, 13] that require the user to hold specific quantum information locally in order to allow their
quantum-enabled token to be validated.
What has perhaps not been sufficiently emphasized to date is that the advantages of using quantum states rather than classical
states for money tokens are much clearer in a relativistic context than in a non-relativistic context, for at least two reasons.
1. The advantage given by the unforgeability of quantum tokens is effectively reproducible in principle by cross-checking in
non-relativistic contexts, but not in relativistic contexts.
Unforgeability implies that a quantum token cannot be presented at two space-like separated points, and this gives an advan-
tage that cannot be replicated using standard classical tokens.
In contrast, in effectively non-relativistic scenarios, in which communication times are negligible, effectively instantaneous
cross-checking gives another theoretical solution to the problem of duplication. Admittedly, cross-checking requires potentially
large communication and data storage resources. However, quantum memory technology may also require costly resources, if
and when such technology becomes available. It seems plausible that, in many or even possibly all scenarios, classical data
money with cross-checking may always be cheaper than using quantum money. If so, unforgeability may be a good reason for
preferring quantum money mainly or even only in scenarios where relativistic (or other) signalling constraints are relevant and
cross-checking delays are a significant issue.
2. Quantum tokens may be delocalized in space-time and used to solve summoning and other intrinsically relativistic tasks
that standard classical tokens cannot.
Unknown quantum states, such as those stored in quantum money tokens, can be delocalized and effectively propagated along
multiple paths via teleportation and secret sharing. This allows users to respond to distributed data in ways that are impossible
if they use standard classical tokens that must follow a fixed path in space-time [5–8]. We discuss this further below.
Quantum money and summoning
Summoning
Summoning was originally [4, 5] defined as a task between two mistrustful parties, Alice and Bob, who each have networks of
collaborating agents. Bob creates a quantum state, keeping its classical description secret, and gives it to Alice at some starting
9point. Alice is required to return it at some later point that depends on communications received from Bob at other points.
Various versions of the task have been studied [4–8].
We will consider here a form of summoning described in Ref. [8]. Alice receives an unknown quantum state at the start point
P . Alice must either produce the state at some presentation point Q  P , where Q ∈ {Q1, . . . , QN} or, if there is no valid
presentation point, she should not return the state anywhere.[37] We write Q = ∅ in the latter case. In our examples we will
assume that there is at most one valid presentation point, although our discussion also applies to the case where there may be
any number of valid presentation points if there is a quantum algorithm that always chooses the same valid presentation point
for a given set of inputs [8]. So we have Q ∈ {∅, Q1, . . . , QN}. The identity of Q depends on classical information received at
some set of input points {Pi}Mi=1. The point P and the sets {Pi} and {Qi} are known to both parties in advance of the task. The
sets may overlap, and may include P . We assume that Qi  P for all i.
We take the sets of input and presentation points to be finite. The classical information Alice receives at Pi is an integer mi in
the range 0 ≤ mi ≤ (ni−1). Thus if Q(m1, . . . ,mM ) ∈ {Q1, . . . , QN} then Alice should return the state to Q(m1, . . . ,mM ),
and if Q(m1, . . . ,mM ) = ∅ then she should not return the state. Alice knows the functional dependence of Q and the set
{ni}Mi=1 in advance of the task; she learns the values of the mi only at the points Pi.
Note that we do not assume that Qi  Pj for all i, j; the form of the function Q(m1, . . . ,mN ) may allow an agent at some or
all of the {Qi} to know whether or not their Qi = Q(m1, . . . ,mN ) even though they do not know all the inputs mj .
Scenarios for summoning quantum money
Quantum money schemes, in their simplest form, also involve two parties, who may have networks of collaborating agents,
and who play the roles of issuer (Bob, the Bank) and user (Alice, the Acquirer), as in the classical money schemes discussed
above. As in the case of summoning, Bob creates a quantum state, keeping its classical description secret, and gives it to Alice
at some starting point, in this case as part of a quantum money token.
A natural scenario which combines summoning and quantum money is that Alice is the acquirer of a quantum money token
and wishes to get its quantum state to some point Q in space-time, in order to spend the quantum money there. The point Q –
the best place to spend the money – is determined by classical information she receives at other points in space-time. In this case
we can identify the parties called Alice in the definitions of summoning and of quantum money: there is one party, Alice, who
has quantum money and needs to satisfy a summoning task in order to get its quantum information to the right point.
In some scenarios the parties called Bob might also be identified as a single party: the issuer of the quantum money might,
for some reason, be supplying information that effectively guides Alice as to where to redeem it. In general, though, it is more
natural to separate the roles of the two Bobs. In the context of summoning quantum money, and in Examples 1 and 2 below of
S-money schemes, we will think of the classical inputs to the summoning task as given to Alice by “nature”, or by some other
agency or agencies not necessarily associated with the quantum money issuer (Bob, the Bank). The role of the issuer is restricted
to participating in the token or money scheme and verifying that a previously issued token is validly presented according to the
scheme rules. Alice wishes to satisfy the summoning task not because Bob requires her to – he may not care where she redeems
her money, so long as it is valid – but because she knows, given the classical information she received in the summoning task,
that it is most advantageous to her to redeem the money token at a particular point.
For example, the classical inputs in the summoning task may be local prices of some commodity, or some more general
function of local market data, or local temperatures or wind speeds, at the given space-time points. The summoning task here is
chosen to indicate to Alice where it is most likely to be advantageous for her to present her money or token in order to carry out
a transaction.
We will assume that Alice does not need to prove to Bob that the classical inputs took the values mi that she learned at the
points Pi. Indeed she may not necessarily need even to report these values to Bob at all, unless the form of the token scheme
uses these values as part of the definition of the token.[38]
If they do, then, for example, her local agents at Pi may be required to give the classical values mi to Bob’s local agents at
Pi. However the token scheme allows Bob to accept these reported values without independent verification. If Alice misreports
in this scenario, then the token will either be valid at a less advantageous point or not valid anywhere. Alice thus has no motive
to misreport; if she does, it is her problem, not Bob’s.
In Examples 3 and 4, Alice receives inputs both from nature and from Bob, the Bank. These jointly define her summoning
task. In these examples we again assume that Alice does not need to prove to Bob that the classical inputs from nature took the
values mi that she learned at the points Pi.
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Quantum money and deterministic summoning tasks
Suppose then that Alice is given a quantum money token containing an unknown quantum state ψ at a point P in a network,
and wishes to propagate the quantum state over the network, exploiting the power of general quantum operations, with the
goal of satisfying a summoning task that allows her to present the money at a desired space-time point identified as a function
of incoming data at earlier points. Suppose further that this summoning task is possible and that she follows a deterministic
algorithm that implements it. By “deterministic”, we mean here that the algorithm always propagates the state to the same
presentation point for a given set of incoming data.
Following this algorithm, her local agent at any network point Q  P may receive a quantum state produced by the previous
actions of local agents. The local agent at Q may also introduce one or more new quantum states, which may be entangled with
states that may be introduced elsewhere in the network – for example parts of singlets to be used for teleportation.[39] The local
agent at Q may then apply a general unitary UQ which acts on these states collectively and propagates outputs along secure
channels Ci to further network points Ri  Q. The states introduced at Q and unitaries UQ may depend on local information
made available to the local agent at (or before) Q. Local agents may also apply general measurement operations. We can
either treat these either as projective measurements (with appropriate ancillae) in the standard projection postulate formalism, or
enlarge the Hilbert space and consider measurements as unitary quantum operations. We take the latter course, since it simplifies
the discussion. So, although the user’s algorithm may involve operations such as teleportation that, if we apply the projection
postulate, produce random classical data, we treat these as deterministic unitary quantum operations.
By assumption, Alice’s local agents follow an algorithm which determines all these local operations as a function of local
classical information inputs mi at the input points Pi, in a manner consistent with the causal structure (so the operations at Q
depend only on inputs at points Pi such that Q  Pi). We suppose that this algorithm guarantees that the quantum money token
state ψ will always be recreated at a valid presentation point Qj if there is one, and that for any given set of data inputs the
chosen valid presentation point is always the same. We also suppose that the algorithm gives Alice’s agent at Qj the information
that she has the token state and that Qj is a valid presentation point. The agent then, having reconstructed ψ, may return the
quantum money token. That is, Alice’s algorithm guarantees successfully summoning the money to the required point, which is
uniquely determined by the data inputs.
Classical emulation of summoning quantum money
We say a classical S-money token scheme emulates a successful quantum summoning algorithm for quantum money if, for
every possible set of inputs to the quantum algorithm, the classical scheme has the effect of producing a valid token at the point
where the quantum summoning algorithm would have generated and presented the quantum money state. Thus, instead of Bob
giving Alice a quantum money state (known to Bob but not Alice) at the start point P , they initiate the classical S-money token
scheme with agreed rules.[40]
To do this, they may proceed as follows. At each point Q, A’s local agent communicates to B’s local agent a classical
description of the choice of UQ and the nature of any new quantum states introduced. For example, at Q they may say “we
introduce here singlet n, whose other subsystem is available for introduction at point Q′”. If they do, then at Q′ they may say
“we introduce here singlet n, whose other subsystem is available for introduction at point Q”, but they may instead say they are
introducing some other state, or none. Whether their actions are coordinated or not depends on their decision algorithm and on
the information available to them at the relevant points.
To present a S-money token at Z, A’s local agent describes the operation UZ and then states that she wishes to present
the token. B’s local agent at Z verifies that the token is potentially valid by checking that the set of quantum operations and
introduced states described in the past light cone of Z would indeed have produced the state ψ at Z. If so, the no-cloning theorem
assures B that no potentially valid token can be presented at any point space-like separated from Z. The token is thus valid, and
may be accepted.
Any deterministic quantum money summoning algorithm may thus be emulated by a classical S-money token scheme. In this
sense, S-money can solve any deterministic summoning task that quantum money can.
Efficient S-money schemes for summoning tasks
We have shown that S-money can classically emulate summoning quantum money tokens. This gives one way in which S-
money can solve a deterministic summoning task that is solvable by quantum money summoning. However, there are often far
more efficient S-money solutions.
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Example 1 Consider a task in which incoming data arrives at a set of pre-agreed input points {Pi}Ni=1 and the S-money
token may be presented at one of a set of presentation points {Qi}2i=1, with the spatial locations of all Pi and Qi lying on the
surface of a sphere (for example, the Earth) in a given frame. Here the Pi are all located on the Equator, and have time coordinate
t = 0; Q1 and Q2 are located at the two poles, and have time coordinate t = T , where T is the time taken to send a light signal
from a point on the Equator to one of the poles. (We may either assume it is possible for light speed signals to be sent through
the interior of the sphere, or that both parties agree this is technologically infeasible, in which case they must go around the
surface. The time T is calculated accordingly.) Suppose that at t = 0 each point Pi supplies data in the form of a subset Si of
the set {Q1, Q2}. That is, each Pi “chooses” neither presentation point, or one of them, or both of them.
Suppose that it is pre-agreed that if any subset of {Pi}Ni=1 belonging to some pre-agreed list of subsets {S11 , . . . , SN11 } chooses
Q1, the token is potentially valid at Q1. Similarly, it is pre-agreed that if any subset of {Pi}Ni=1 belonging to some pre-agreed
list of subsets {S12 , . . . , SN22 } of input points chooses Q2, the token is potentially valid at Q2. (Here each superscript labels a
distinct subset, so we necessarily have N1, N2 ≤ 2N and N1, N2 < 2N for non-trivial examples; we expect N1, N2  2N for
typical interesting examples.)
We can define a S-money scheme for this task as follows. As soon as Alice’s agents at Pi receive the set Si, they send the
set Si to Bob’s agents at Pi. They also send the information to Alice’s agents at light speed to both presentation points. Bob’s
agents at Pi also send the information they receive at light speed to Bob’s agents at both presentation points. The token may be
presented as soon as the signals have reached the presentation points. To check that the token is valid and may be presented and
accepted at Q1, Alice and Bob’s local agents need to check:
(a) that some valid subset S1(i) of input points have included Q1, so that the token is potentially valid at Q1;
(b) that no valid subset S2(j) of input points have included Q2, so that the token cannot also be potentially valid at Q2.
Validity at Q2 is similarly determined.
𝑄2
𝑄1
𝑃𝑛
𝑃2
𝑃1
FIG. 2: Left: input and presentation points in Example 1. The spatial locations of the input points are on the Equator, while those of the
presentation points are the Poles. Right: input and presentation points in Example 2. The spatial locations of the input points are densely
distributed around the sphere. The presentation points have the same spatial locations.
Example 2 Consider input points whose spatial locations are distributed on a spatial network over the surface of a sphere.
We may take this network to be relatively dense. For instance, if the sphere is radius 1 we could suppose that every circle on the
surface of radius  contains at least one network point, for some  1.
In this example, the spatial location of every input point is also the spatial location of a presentation point, and the time
coordinate of the input points is t = 0 in an agreed frame. Thus the input points take the form Pi = (xi, 0), where the 3-vector
xi represents the i-th spatial location. The presentation points are Qi = (xi, T ), where T is the time required for a light signal
to go between antipodal points. (Again, the parties may agree that communication at light speed by shortest path is possible, or
alternatively that no communication through the interior of the sphere is possible; T is calculated accordingly.)
The data presented to Alice’s agents at each input point Pi is the value of some function f(Pi) calculated at that point. This
function might, for example, be the price of a stock at the relevant node of the financial network at t = 0. It might also be some
data generated from market data available at Pi by a complicated algorithm that Alice does not necessarily want to reveal to
Bob. Alice’s local agent at each Pi gives the value f(Pi) to Bob’s co-located agent, who broadcasts them to all Bob’s agents
located at the presentation points. Alice’s local agents also broadcast the values f(Pi) to all Alice’s agents at the presentation
points. At time T , Alice’s and Bob’s agents at each presentation point will have received all the data from all the input points.
The token is potentially valid at a presentation point Qj = (xj , T ), if the data show that the function f takes its maximum value
at Pj = (xj , 0). The token is valid at Qj if it is not also potentially valid at any other presentation point, i.e. if the data show
12
that the maximum at Pj is unique. (Thus, in this scheme, if there are N > 1 global maxima then there is no valid presentation
point for the token.)
Solutions with quantum money tokens
Standard quantum money tokens can also solve the summoning tasks given in the first two examples. One method, applicable
to both examples, is to begin with the token at one input point and carry out a sequence of teleportation operations through all
the input points, implementing a non-local quantum computation that results in a quantum state at the correct presentation point
which can be converted to the token state using the accumulated incoming teleportation data [14, 15].
This requires the user to have agents at all input points and to have entanglement resources that depend exponentially on the
number of sites, and near-perfect teleportation. It thus may be far from an optimal solution in terms of resource use. It would
be very interesting to understand how efficiently these tasks and others of their type can be solved and to prove lower bounds on
the resources required. We leave these questions for future work.
Although this method for summoning quantum money tokens requires more resources from the user (to the extent that it may
not be technologically possible in the forseeable future) than the S-money scheme above, it is worth noting that it makes fewer
demands on the issuer. If quantum money is used, the issuer’s agents need not receive inputs from the user agents during the
scheme: they need only to be ready to validate the quantum money token when presented.
Solving constrained summoning tasks with S-money
Example 3 Consider a variation of Example 2, with the same spatial locations for the network points, but different S-
money token rules. In this version, at t = 0, the protocol requires Bob’s agents to make coordinated announcements to Alice’s
co-located agents at each input point Pi, each identifying the same subset S ⊂ {Pi} that defines the subset of Bob’s agents that
will participate in the scheme. (Bob might, for example, know in advance that some of his agents will be out of action at any
given time, but not wish to reveal which ahead of time.) Thus, both Bob-the-bank and “nature” provide input data for Alice’s
summoning task.
In this variation, the S-money token may become potentially valid after time T ′, where T ′ is the maximum time re-
quired for a light signal to travel between a pair (Pi, Pj) where {Pi, Pj} ⊂ S. It is potentially valid at Pi ∈ S if
f(Pi) = max{f(Pj) : Pj ∈ S}. It is valid at Pi ∈ S if there is no other presentation point at which it is potentially valid,
i.e. if Pi is its unique maximum in S. (Again, this scheme allows no valid presentation point if there are N > 1 global maxima
in S.)
The S-money scheme guarantees that, if Bob behaves honestly by declaring the same subset S at each input point, then both
Alice and Bob can verify that the S-money token is valid at T ′ at the unique maximum point Pi ∈ S, when there is a unique
maximum. Alice can check there that Bob’s agents at every Pi ∈ S identified the same set S of participants; Bob can check
there that it is indeed the unique maximum of f in S.
The no-summoning theorem [4] shows that there are configurations of input and presentation points for which Alice cannot
generally solve the task defining this scheme by summoning a quantum money token. For example, suppose there are two disjoint
subsets S, S′ of {Pi} such that the corresponding sets of presentation points R = {Qi : Pi ∈ S} and R′ = {Qi : Pi ∈ S′} have
the properties that R is space-like separated from S′ and R′ from S. Suppose that Bob’s agents at points Pi ∈ S all identify
S, while Bob’s agents at points Pi ∈ S′ all identify S′. Then Alice would be required to propagate the quantum token state to
two space-like separated points, which is impossible. Now, her ability to solve the task if Bob identifies S at all points in S is
independent of what Bob’s agents at points in S′ say, and vice versa. Hence she cannot guarantee both to solve the task if all
Bob’s agents identify S and also to do so if they all identify S′.
Comments on Example 3 Bob’s agents may cheat in this scheme by sending inconsistent information to Alice’s co-
located agents. If they do, there may be no point in space-time at which Alice is persuaded the S-money token is even potentially
valid, in which case she does not present or spend the token.
Another possibility is that two or more of Alice’s may be persuaded the token is actually valid at two or more space-like
separated points. This would be the case, for example, if there are disjoint sets S and S′ such that the corresponding sets of
presentation points R = {Qi : Pi ∈ S} and R′ = {Qi : Pi ∈ S′} have the property that R is spacelike separated from S′ and
R′ is spacelike separated from S, and Bob’s agents at points Pi ∈ S all identify S, while Bob’s agents at points Pi ∈ S′ all
identify S′. If so, Alice may present and try to spend the token at two or more points; Bob then either has to allow the token to
be spent multiply or acknowledge his cheating at one or more of the relevant points.
While the possibility of presenting inconsistent information in this scheme may be advantageous to Bob in some scenarios,
Alice retains the decision whether to actually spend the token. Also, a bank that cheats by making inconsistent declarations is
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likely to suffer reputationally. Alice may thus be willing to participate in a scheme of this type, despite the possibility that Bob
may cheat, since she may see the risks and drawbacks as acceptably limited.
An interesting variant of this task prevents Bob from sending inconsistent inputs while preventing Alice from learning his
inputs before the time at which she may present a valid token. This is done by requiring Bob’s agent at some pre-agreed point
P0 ∈ {Pi} to make a cryptographic commitment of Bob’s input to Alice’s co-located agent, using a secure bit string commitment
scheme. In this variant, the token is valid after time T (where T is defined as in Example 2), so that Alice’s agent at P0 may
broadcast the commitment data received from Bob’s agent there to Alice’s agents at all the presentation points at Qi. Similarly,
Bob’s agent at P0 broadcasts all the data he received or retained from the commitment to all Bob’s agents at the Qi. Bob’s
agents at each presentation point Qi may then simultaneously unveil the commitment, and Alice’s located agents may each
instantaneously verify the validity of the unveiling. The encrypted commitment prevents Alice from using the information in
Bob’s input until it is unveiled, and means that the task cannot be solved by summoning a quantum money token. (This remains
true even if the presentation points Qi are at time later than T .) We discuss this further in Example 4 below.
S-money with variable value tokens and sub-tokens
Variable value tokens
S-money may be extended by including rules that make the value of a valid S-money token depend on the information defining
the token. For instance, in Example 2 above, the token value could depend on some function of the global distribution of the
values of the function that are reported at the presentation point and that validate the token there. One simple possibility would
be for the token value to be the difference between the global maximum and global minimum.
Variable value subtokens with specified validity constraints
A further interesting class of extensions allows the scheme to define one or more valid sub-tokens that may be presented at
different (perhaps space-like separated) points, and whose values may also depend on the scheme data communicated at or to
those points. In this case, the issuer defines the security of the scheme by a set of constraints on the values and locations of the
sub-tokens. The scheme data communicated at or to any sub-token presentation point must guarantee that no set of sub-tokens
may be presented at locations that violate these constraints.
Such constraints may be quite general: a sub-token need not have value given by a fixed fraction of a token. For example, the
scheme might allow either 10 credits at a single market site, or sub-tokens to a sum value of no more than 7 credits at up to three
sites on the same continent, or sub-tokens with an individual value of up to 3 credits on sites at up to 5 distinct continents.
These features are not generally replicable by any standard quantum money token scheme. For instance, in Example 2, a
quantum token may be delocalized and propagated so that it is reconstructed at the unique maximum point. However, for the
user and issuer to agree on its value there requires the user to prove to the issuer the value of a function of the global distribution
of function values chosen at the input points. In a S-money solution, these chosen values are communicated directly by local user
agents to local issuer agents. Absent such communications, no set of operations by the user on the quantum token can encode
this value (for general functions) in a way that allows the issuer to deduce it with certainty when the output state is returned to
him.
TOKEN SCHEMES AND USER PRIVACY
Privacy for tokens that follow definite paths
Token schemes may be designed to guarantee the user various types of privacy. For tokens that are defined to follow definite
paths in space-time we can sensibly describe these in terms of the inferences that can or cannot be made about points or segments
of the token’s path.
Suppose that such a token is issued at point P and is defined for a network with points V = {Pi}Ni=1, so that it may be trans-
mitted causally between some pairs of points on the network, given by a set E ⊂ {(Pi, Pj) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ N,Pi ≺ Pj}.
Thus a token following the scheme rules will follow a path P → P1 → . . .→ Pk, where (P, P1), (P1, P2), . . . , (Pk−1, Pk) ∈ E,
and may or may not be presented at the final point Pk. We can assign it a worldline by assigning it a linear path segment between
any successive pair of points. Thus any spacelike hypersurface S contains is a finite subset of points Poss(S) = {Si}li=1 through
which a valid token’s path may possibly pass.
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We say such a scheme offers present privacy if it does not require the user to give away any information about the token’s
location on any spacelike hypersurface, unless she chooses to present the token there, beyond the information that can be inferred
from the constraints on possible paths implied by E. Thus, if the token has not been presented in the causal past of S, and if the
user follows the scheme, the collective information available to all issuer agents at points Q ≺ S or Q ∈ S implies only that the
token may be at any Si ∈ Poss(S).
We say the scheme offers future privacy if the information it requires the user to give at any locations Q ≺ S or Q ∈ S does
not imply any information about the token’s locations at points in the causal future of S, beyond the constraints implied by E.
We say it offers past privacy if the information it requires the user to give in propagating the token by any valid means from
P to some network point Q  P and in presenting it there implies no information about any intermediate locations, beyond the
constraints implied by E. That is, a presentation at Q implies only that the token followed some path P → P1 → . . .→ Pk →
Q, where each successive pair belongs to E.
Quantum money token schemes and user privacy
Consider now a quantum money token scheme in which the user is given a token quantum state at a start point P , may carry out
arbitrary quantum operations at network points Pi, and may present the token quantum state at some network point Q  P . For
general networks, this allows the user to delocalize the quantum state, relocalizing it before or at the point where it is presented.
The token thus need not follow a definite path.
Consider a standard cryptographic scenario in which the user’s agents are able to carry out quantum operations of their choice
at secure sites in the vicinity of each network point, and are able to communicate securely from network point Pi to network
point Pj whenever Pj  Pi. In this scenario, the issuer obtains no information about the token’s presentation point, prior to
presentation, beyond that implied by signalling constraints: it may be presented at any network point Q  P . The issuer also
obtains no information, after presentation, beyond that implied by signalling constraints and quantum theory: the token may
have been propagated from P to Q by any algorithm allowed by relativistic quantum theory.
In this sense, the standard cryptographic scenario for quantum money tokens offers the user as complete a form of privacy as
relativistic quantum theory permits. This includes past, present and future privacy as defined above in the case where the user is
restricted to propagating the token along definite paths.
We may extend the above definitions of past, present and future privacy to schemes, such as quantum money token schemes,
in which the token has a quantum state ψS defined on any spacelike hypersurface S, with the property that the possible user
actions (including actions on the token and presentation of the token) in the future of S depend only on ψS .
We say such a scheme offers present privacy if it does not require the user to give away any information about the token state
ψS on any spacelike hypersurface S, unless she chooses to present the token there, beyond the information that can be inferred
from signalling constraints.
We say the scheme offers future privacy if the information it requires the user to give at any locations Q ≺ S or Q ∈ S does
not imply any information about the token state ψS′ on any hypersurfaces S′ in the causal future of S, beyond those implied by
signalling constraints.
We say it offers past privacy if the information it requires the user to give in propagating the token by any valid means from P
to some network point Q  P and in presenting it there implies no information about its state ψS on any hypersurface S lying
between P and Q, beyond those implied by signalling constraints.
The standard cryptographic scenario for quantum money tokens offers the user past, present and future privacy, by these
definitions.
User privacy for encrypted S-money schemes
We now consider user privacy for virtual token schemes such as S-money. In unencrypted S-money schemes such as those
described in Examples 1 and 2, the virtual token is defined by unencrypted communications – user token inputs – from the user’s
agents to the issuer’s co-located agents at input points, and the valid presentation point is determined by these communications.
In Example 3, the virtual token is defined by a combination of the user token inputs and unencrypted communications – issuer
token inputs – from the issuer’s agents to the user’s co-located agents, at the same input points.
We want to consider encrypted versions of S-money schemes such as these, which allow past, present and future privacy, in
appropriate senses. Specifically, we consider encryptions with the following features:
1. each user token input may be introduced, at the relevant input point, as the committed string in a bit string commitment
protocol initiated between the user’s and issuer’s local agents.
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2. data obtained from the commitment phase of the protocol by the user and issuer’s local agents are classical, and thus may
be broadcast to all presentation points in the causal future of the relevant input point (the commitment point).
3. data obtained from any subsequent sustaining phases by user and issuer agents at appropriate points are also classical and
may similarly be broadcast.
4. the user’s local agent may unveil the committed string at any/all presentation points in the causal future of the commitment
point, and the issuer’s local agent may verify the unveiled commitment at any presentation point where it is unveiled. (For
some types of protocol (e.g. [9]), the verification protocol may require a pre-agreed time interval. If so, this interval should
be short compared to typical network scales.)
We say an encrypted S-money scheme of this type offers the user present and future privacy if the issuer obtains no information
about the user token inputs prior to the presentation of the token, beyond that implied by the scheme rules that constrain allowed
inputs. In particular this means that, for any spacelike hypersurface S, if the token has not been presented at any point Q ≺ S or
Q ∈ S, the user’s inputs at all such points give the issuer no information about the points Q′  S at which the token may validly
be presented, beyond that implied by signalling constraints.
We say the scheme offers the user past privacy if the issuer obtains no information about the user token inputs even after
presentation of the token, beyond that implied by the scheme rules. This means that, if the token is presented at Q, the issuer
learns only that the user gave some valid set of inputs consistent with presentation at Q: he learns no information about which
set of inputs, if the scheme rules allow more than one
Motivations for user privacy
Each type of privacy may be valued for a variety of reasons. For token types that could be stolen if located, present and future
privacy enhance security. For tokens carried by individuals, whose location thus closely correlates with the token’s, past, present
or future token privacy are necessary for the corresponding forms of personal locational privacy.
Since S-money schemes assume that user and issuer communications are authenticated, they protect the parties against token
theft, even in the absence of privacy. However, in some scenarios, the user may only have one or a few agents, who may value
their personal locational privacy. Even if the user is a financial institution represented by a network of collaborating agents
operating at known secure sites, present and future privacy of the token scheme may be highly desirable for other reasons. For
example, if the user’s token represents a large sum of money to be used somewhere on the global financial network, with the
location and time decided by a complex trading strategy, she may wish to conceal the token’s present and future location from
other agencies, so that they cannot exploit advance information about her possible trades. She may perhaps also value past
privacy, so as not to reveal any more information about her trading strategy than necessary, even after a trade.
Privacy in other types of money
It should be stressed at this point that a wide range of cryptographic money schemes with sophisticated privacy mechanisms
already exist, including for example Chaum-Fiat-Naor’s ECash [16, 17] and cryptocurrencies such as ZCash [41] and Monero
[18]. As noted above, one of the advantages of quantum money schemes [2, 10–13] is that they typically guarantee past, present
and future privacy. Public quantum money schemes (e.g. [19]) and quantum coins [20] give further privacy, since transactions
need not involve the bank.
We certainly do not want to suggest that these schemes are superseded by S-money, nor that S-money necessarily offers
equivalent privacy in all respects and all scenarios. Nor do we claim that the privacy techniques we consider below are optimally
efficient for S-money or offer the greatest degree of privacy attainable. We wish only to make two positive points. First, as
we have noted, relativistic scenarios raise interesting new privacy issues that deserve attention and require new definitions.
Second, privacy adequate for many (though not necessarily all) purposes can in principle be incorporated into S-money. Since
S-money has some other clear advantages in some interesting relativistic scenarios (and in other scenarios with trusted signalling
constraints), this encourages us to think that it deserves consideration alongside existing proposals. As we noted earlier, the
best schemes in network scenarios with trusted signalling constraints may ultimately combine concepts and techniques from
S-money and from other proposals.
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Encrypted S-money with present and future privacy
Encrypted S-money schemes add an extra layer of security, by allowing the user to communicate all their inputs in an effec-
tively encrypted form, which the issuer can only read if the user chooses to decrypt them. The user needs to do this only if they
wish to present the token at a valid presentation point, and the inputs become readable by the issuer only at that point. In their
simplest form, the user’s local agent at each input point Pi introduces her user token input as the committed string in a single
(i.e. non-redundant) bit string commitment protocol. The protocol commits her to the token input but does not reveal it to the
issuer’s local agent.
Bit string commitments may be made using protocols involving the short distance transmission of classical or quantum data,
with security based on relativistic signalling constraints [9, 21–25]. Such schemes need two or more user agents communicating
with adjacent issuer agents; many configurations of agents are possible. Depending on the agent configurations and the choice of
spacetime point at which the commitment may be unveiled, the schemes may require multiple rounds of communication between
each pair of agents. The bit string commitments could also be made by schemes that are not information theoretically secure but
are presently believed to be computationally secure (e.g. [26]) or by “post-quantum” bit string commitment schemes designed
also to be computationally secure against quantum computers.
We require protocols in which the data obtained from the commitment phase by the user and issuer’s local agents are classical,
and thus may be broadcast to all presentation points in the causal future of the relevant input point (the commitment point),
and the data obtained from any subsequent sustaining phases by user and issuer agents at appropriate points are also classical
and may similarly be broadcast. This is true of the schemes of Refs. [9, 21]. However the security of multi-round versions
of these schemes against general quantum adversaries is not proven. It is also true of classical schemes that are believed
to be computationally secure against classical or quantum computers, although of course these schemes are not information-
theoretically secure. For definiteness, we focus our present discussion on a variant of the scheme of Ref. [22], for which the
appropriate information theoretic security is provable [24, 27].
As we explain in the supplementary material, this variant actually does not necessarily require the user to commit herself to a
given bit string at the point where the communications defining the commitment phase take place. It is thus more accurately de-
scribed as a protocol for a closely related relativistic task, which we term bit string coordination. However, this is adequate, since
the security criteria for encrypted S-money also require secure bit string coordination rather than secure bit string commitment.
Privacy for issuer inputs in S-money schemes
We have defined present and future privacy as security desiderata for the user, without considering the issuer’s privacy. Indeed,
in many scenarios the issuer either does not input any information during the scheme or may input only information that he is
happy to be made public. In either case, he has no privacy concerns.
However, in some scenarios, when participating in S-money schemes such as Example 3, in which he inputs data that affect
when and where the token may be valid, the issuer may wish to ensure that these data are kept temporarily private and/or that
they are made public only if and when a token is presented. He may ensure this by using bit string commitment or coordination
schemes to commit to the data without immediately revealing them. Precisely what form of security the user may demand from
the issuer – bit string commitment or bit string coordination – depends on the scenario. The parties also need to agree how to
coordinate the unveilings of their respective bit string commitments (for example by agreeing that one of them should unveil
first, or by agreeing to unveil at adjacent spacelike separated locations) in protocols of this type.
Example 4 Consider the following variation of Example 3, with the same network as Example 2 but different S-money
token rules. In this version, at t = 0, Bob’s agent at some pre-agreed point P ∈ {Pi}makes a commitment to Alice’s co-located
agent, using a secure bit string commitment or coordination scheme that guarantees coordinated unveilings at all the presentation
points Qj . (Recall that these have the same spatial locations as the input points, and time coordinate T , the time required for
a signal to travel between antipodal points.) Bob’s commitment identifies a subset S ⊂ {Pi} that defines the subset of Bob’s
agents that will participate in the scheme. Alice’s local agent at each Pi make coordinated commitments of the value f(Pi) to
Bob’s co-located agents, using a secure bit string commitment or coordination scheme that guarantees coordinated unveilings at
all the presentation points Qj .
At time T , Bob’s agents at each presentation point unveil the bit string commitment identifying the subset S of in-
put/presentation points on which the token is defined. Alice’s agents unveil their coordinated commitments of the values of
f(Pi) for the input points belonging to that subset.
In this variation, the S-money token is potentially valid after time T at a location Pi ∈ S if f(Pi) = max{f(Pj) : Pj ∈ S}. It
is valid at Pi if there is no other point at which it could be potentially valid, i.e. if Pi is the unique maximum point in S. (Thus,
again, this scheme allows no valid presentation point if there are N > 1 global maxima in S.)
17
The S-money scheme guarantees that both Alice and Bob can verify that the S-money token is valid at T at the unique
maximum point Pi ∈ S, when there is a unique maximum. Bob can check there that it is indeed the unique maximum of
f in S. Bob’s bit string commitment or coordination scheme guarantees to Alice that Bob’s agents at all of the presentation
points Qj identify the same set S of participants; it guarantees to Bob that Alice cannot identify this set S until he unveils at
the presentation points. Alice’s bit string commitment or coordination scheme guarantees to Bob that Alice’s agents at each
presentation point Qj unveil the same set of values f(Pi) of the function at the input points.
The no-summoning theorem [4] shows that Alice cannot generally solve the task defining this scheme by summoning a
quantum money token. If S and S′ are space-like separated sets of presentation points, she may be required to present the
quantum token either at a presentation point in S or at a presentation point in S′, and has no advance information as to which.
Encrypted S-money and past privacy
In the embodiments discussed above,A presents toB at her final chosen pointQ a classical string of bits defining commitment
data for the various commitments that encrypt the data defining the S-money token. B can use these commitment data, together
with his validation data, to unveil the commitments, and thus obtain the unencrypted S-money token input data. This allows B
to validate the S-money token at Q, but also gives B all the token input data.
To prevent this and ensure past privacy, A and B may proceed as follows. B may present to A the requirements for a token
to be valid at Q in the form of a testing algorithm, which may for example include statistical tests that allow for some level
of errors and for statistical variance in the outcomes of any quantum measurements A may have made in the course of the
commitment protocols. This algorithm may conveniently be agreed in advance, although in principle it could be specified by B
at Q. Instead of sending commitment data directly, A may encrypt it using any standard cryptographically or unconditionally
secure bit commitment scheme, in a redundant form that allows A and B to follow a zero-knowledge proof protocol (e.g. Ref.
[28]) that simultaneously guarantees to B that the commitment data correspond to a token valid at Q and guarantees to A that B
learns no information about the S-money token input data other than the information implied by its initial state, its validity at Q,
the rules of the given S-money scheme, and the no-superluminal signalling principle.
SECURITY AND PRACTICALITY: ISSUES AND EXTENSIONS
We have suggested a conception of secure S-money tokens in space-time implemented by local communications between user
and issuer agents, and characterised by security properties of the token scheme. The key feature of our schemes is a guarantee
against multiple presentation of apparently valid S-money tokens. This is ensured by the logical structure of the schemes. The
schemes require communications to be completed in small regions around each network point. In their simplest versions, they
require the issuer agents to transmit information received from user agents to all issuer agents in their causal future, who must
store it until it can no longer be relevant. Depending on the details of the token scheme, this may require storing it until they
learn that the token has been validly presented. These communication and storage requirements imply technology-dependent
bounds on the network density and on token lifetimes. However, the schemes can clearly be implemented securely for many
interesting and realistic examples of networks and token lifetimes.
Extensions of the scheme to allow present, future and past privacy raise new questions. Unconditionally secure bit commit-
ment schemes can be proven secure, against both classical and quantum adversaries, assuming only the validity of quantum
theory and special relativity, when used to commit a single bit, at least for a single round [9, 22–25]. These schemes are also
unconditionally and composably secure against the receiver, Bob, since from his perspective the information he receives [42] for
each committed bit is random, and is uncorrelated between commitments. Specific zero knowledge protocols based on relativis-
tic bit commitments have also been proved secure [29]. However, security and efficiency questions for general zero knowledge
protocols based on relativistic bit commitment schemes remain open. A fortiori, this is also true for protocols that incorporate bit
commitments and zero knowledge proofs as subprotocols. S-money token schemes add further motivation for exploring these
intriguing questions.
As we have noted, secure S-money schemes need to ensure that the decrypts of encrypted data are securely coordinated, not
necessarily that the user was securely committed to these data at some specified input point. Still, the composable security of
such schemes against a committer equipped with unlimited quantum technology, who may be unveiling many commitments,
each at many sites, remains to be fully analysed. It also remains to be understood how to optimize such protocols for efficiency,
so that a given level or type of security can be guaranteed with minimal (classical and/or quantum) communication, storage,
entanglement or information processing resources.
As noted earlier, S-money token schemes could alternatively be based on classical non-relativistic bit commitment schemes
that are believed to be computationally secure against classical or quantum computers. Composability issues are a much less
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serious concern (albeit not proven irrelevant) if such schemes are used, and we believe present technology should allow our these
versions of our schemes to be implemented in some interesting and practically relevant examples with good security.
While we have shown that interesting S-money schemes with significant advantages may be based on bit commitment, bit
coordination and zero knowledge protocols, we do not claim these techniques are generally optimal. Our results and examples
should be taken as existence theorems that may motivate work on potentially more efficient or alternatives. For example, it
would be interesting to explore using appropriate secure multi-party computations to guarantee the validity of a token at the
presentation point without revealing the token input data.[43]
Our schemes have been presented in a scenario where there is a well-defined network with an issuer agent at every node. They
can be extended to scenarios where issuer and user agents may not have precisely guaranteed location, and may both be mobile.
For example, user agents may broadcast authenticated token input data, to be received by issuer agents wherever they are. An
issuer agent will accept a presented token as valid only when (a) they have received the presentation data for the token, (b) all the
relevant token input data has been relayed to them by other issuer agents. Of course, this will generally involve delays between
presentation and acceptance. Unless the user has some guarantees about the location of issuer agents, they have no guarantee
about the duration of these delays. However if, for example, each issuer agent is guaranteed to be within a specified region of
small radius, these delays may be guaranteed to be small. It would be interesting to study more general examples.
In our network model in which local user and issuer agents have authenticated channels, S-money tokens or sub-tokens can
be transferred from one user to another by local authenticated communications. Indeed, each individual token input datum can
be separately transferred, whether or not it defines a sub-token in the scheme. For example, Alice’s local agent at Pi can tell
Bob’s local agent Bi that her local token data is now associated with Charlie, and Bi can confirm this with Charlie’s local agent
Ci. Bi communicates this to Bob’s agents in the causal future of Pi, who will no longer accept this input datum as part a valid
token presentable by Alice, but will accept it as part of a valid token presentable by Charlie. In general, transferring a complete
S-money token thus requires coordinated actions between triples (Ai, Bi, Ci at more than one network point Pi. Transferring a
delocalized quantum money token also requires coordinated actions between pairs (Ai, Ci) at more than one Pi. However, an
advantage of quantum money is that the agents Bi need not be involved. This may not be a significant advantage in scenarios
where all the relevant parties have agents at all network points and where the parties are not concerned about keeping ownership
private from the bank, but there are certainly other natural scenarios in which it is important. It would thus be particularly
interesting to investigate other mechanisms for transferring S-money tokens.
CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed defining secure S-money token schemes that (i) prevent space-like duplication, (ii) allow the solution
of generalised summoning tasks, including tasks that cannot be solved by standard quantum money schemes. We have also
proposed extensions of these schemes involving general types of subtoken that also satisfy (i-ii) and have very flexible proper-
ties. These token and sub-token schemes have implementations with current technology for many types of practically relevant
network.
We have also proposed refinements of these schemes that offer past, present and future privacy, modulo questions about
composable security that remain to be fully addressed. Their optimal implementations remain to be characterised, as does the
full range of tasks for which they can be practically implemented with present technology.
Quantum money schemes offer other ways of satisfying (i) and of solving some generalised summoning tasks, and guarantee
past, present and future privacy to the extent quantum theory allows. While S-money token schemes can in principle solve any
deterministic summoning task that can be solved with quantum money, the converse is not true. Quantum money schemes with
long token lifetimes are not feasible with current technology.
Intriguing theoretical and practical questions about the relative advantages, implementability and resource costs of S-money
and quantum money token schemes thus remain. We hope this will motivate further theoretical and experimental work.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: BIT STRING COORDINATION AND BIT STRING COMMITMENT
In our main scenario for S-money, the user inputs data at various space-time points, and these inputs collectively determine
the space-time point at which the S-money token will be valid. Effectively, the user freely controls the destiny of the S-money
token, and the scheme is designed to give as much freedom to the user as possible while preventing fraudulent presentation of
duplicate tokens. In this scenario, it is not an additional security requirement that the user necessarily must be committed to a
specific destination by choices made at specific pre-agreed points in space-time.
So, if the user’s inputs are encrypted, the necessary security requirement for S-money is that the user should not be able
to produce different apparently valid decrypts of the same input at different space-time points (and in particular at space-like
separated points). This does not necessarily imply that the user was committed to a specific decrypt value at the input point.
It is thus possible in principle to implement secure S-money schemes, and to maintain present and future user privacy, while
using subprotocols that guarantee bit string coordination, meaning that any two apparently valid decrypts of a bit string must
(with suitably high probability) be identical. This can be done without necessarily guaranteeing bit string commitment at some
specified input point.
The weaker security requirement is significant even if protocols that guarantee secure bit commitment, and not only secure
bit coordination, are used in a S-money scheme. There are several reasons for this. One is that the security parameters for the
relevant schemes need be chosen only so as ensure appropriately secure bit coordination rather than bit commitment. Another
is that, for schemes with incomplete security proofs against general attacks, we only need to prove that the scheme securely
implements bit coordination rather than bit commitment. Moreover, the composable security of bit commitment protocols
in a S-money scheme need only be analysed with respect to composably secure coordination rather than composably secure
commitment.
Definition of bit coordination
A bit coordination scheme in space-time is a protocol defined in the standard scenario for mistrustful relativistic cryptography.
That is, Alice is represented by a network of collaborating and mutually trusting agents distributed throughout space-time,
occupying secure sites; Bob is represented by a similar network. The secure sites occupied by Alice’s agents are disjoint
from those occupied by Bob’s. The protocol may (and in the cases we focus on does) prescribe a sequence of coordinated
communications between adjacent agents of Alice and Bob taking place within prescribed time windows. However, we assume
the secure sites of adjacent agents are so close in space and the communications so close in time, compared to network point
separations and other protocol time parameters, that we may sensibly consider them as effectively taking place at a single
space-time point.
At some finite set of initial points {Pi}mi=1, Alice’s and Bob’s co-located agents exchange classical and/or quantum informa-
tion, following a prescribed protocol, which may require either or both to make random choices from prescribed distributions.
At another set of final points {Qj}nj=1, Alice’s and Bob’s co-located agents make further exchanges of classical and/or
quantum information, again following a prescribed protocol. These include a declaration of a bit value bj ∈ {0, 1} by each of
Alice’s agents. At each Qj , the protocol stipulates an algorithm in which Bj inputs all the information he received or retained
as part of the protocol, including the value bj , and outputs Oj taking the value accept or reject. If there are no constraints on
Bob’s signalling other than those implied by the causal structure of space-time, we may take the final points Qj to be mutually
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space-like separated, since if Alice declares a bit value bi at Qi then Bob’s agent there may send the declared value bi and his
output Oi to any point Q  Qi.
Alice’s agents may carry out any classical or quantum operations on any information they generate or receive and may transmit
such information to other agents of Alice. Such operations and communications may be required as part of the protocol and may
be required to be implemented securely; we assume secure devices and channels are available as required. The same holds true
for Bob. The protocol stipulates non-empty sets Sb = {Aib : i ∈ I} of coordinated sets of actions, Aib, for Alice’s agents, where
the same indexing set I labels S0 and S1. Alice may choose any set of actions Aib ∈ Sb if she wishes all her agents to unveil bit
value b. Each Aib includes the prescription that each Aj should declare bit value b at Qj .
We say the protocol is -sound if, when Bob honestly follows the protocol and Alice follows any Aib ∈ Sb, the probability that
all of Bob’s agents accept obeys
Prob(O1 = . . . = On = accept ) ≥ 1−  . (1)
We say the protocol is -secure against Alice if, whatever strategy she uses, including strategies not in S0 or S1,
Prob(∃j 6= j′ such that bj 6= bj′ & Oj = Oj′ = accept ) ≤  . (2)
We say the protocol is -concealing if the following condition holds. Suppose that Alice follows prescription Aib for some
given i ∈ I known to Bob and a bit value b ∈ {0, 1} of her choice, everywhere up to the unveiling points Qj , where Alice’s
agents do not send any information. Suppose that Bob’s agents then share all the information received during the protocol,
communicating it all to a single agent B′ at some point Q′, where Q′  QJ for all j. Then B′ can learn no more than  bits of
information about Alice’s chosen bit b.
Note that, while the protocol stipulates a set Sb of actions for Alice’s agents to carry out to ensure that they can almost surely
each declare bit value b and have their declarations accepted, this set need not be an exhaustive list. An -sound and ′-concealing
protocol may also allow Alice other strategies in which she chooses a bit value b, which her agents all unveil, such that all Bob’s
agents accept the unveiling with probability at least (1− ) and such that Bob can learn no more than ′ bits of information about
the chosen bit if it is not unveiled.
Note too that Alice may have strategies that almost surely result in her agents’ all unveiling the same bit and Bob’s agents all
accepting these unveilings, even though some or all of her agents do not know the value of the bit to be unveiled in advance. She
may, for example, prepare a state of the form∑
b=0,1
ab |b〉A1 . . . |b〉An |b〉I1 . . . |b〉IN , (3)
where
∑
b=0,1 |ab|2 = 1, a0 6= 0 6= a1, the state | 〉Ai is an ancilla state sent to Alice’s agent at Qi and the | 〉Ij states are input
into the protocol as required, where input |b〉 corresponds to Alice choosing bit value b. Alice’s agents at Qi may each measure
their | 〉Ai state, each obtaining the same bit value b, which they declare along with the unveiling data prescribed by the protocol.
This superposition strategy is -sound, ′-secure and ′′-concealing if each of its components is. None of Alice’s agents know
the value of b until the point Qi. Nonetheless, this does not per se violate the security criteria. A secure protocol guarantees to
Bob that he will almost certainly reject if any two of Alice’s agents unveil different bit values; it is not required to guarantee to
him that the agents knew these values in advance of unveiling.
Definition of bit string coordination
We define a bit string coordination scheme in space-time similarly. As before, at some finite set of initial points {Pi}mi=1,
Alice’s and Bob’s co-located agents exchange classical and/or quantum information, following a prescribed protocol, which may
require either or both to make random choices from prescribed distributions.
At another set of final points {Qj}nj=1, Alice’s and Bob’s co-located agents make further exchanges of classical and/or
quantum information, again following a prescribed protocol. These include a declaration of a bit string value
sj = bj,0 . . . bj,t−1 ∈ {0, 1}t
by each of Alice’s agents. At each Qj , the protocol stipulates an algorithm in which Bj inputs all the information he received or
retained as part of the protocol, including the value sj , and outputs Oj taking the value accept or reject. Again, if there are
no constraints on Bob’s signalling other than those implied by the causal structure of space-time, we may take the final points to
be mutually space-like separated.
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As before, Alice’s agents may carry out any classical or quantum operations on any information they generate or receive and
may transmit such information to other agents of Alice. Such operations and communications may be required as part of the
protocol and may be required to be implemented securely; we assume secure devices and channels are available as required.
The same holds true for Bob. The protocol stipulates non-empty sets Ss = {Ais : i ∈ I} of coordinated sets of actions, Ais, for
Alice’s agents, where the same indexing set I labels each Ss. Alice may choose any Ais ∈ Ss if she wishes all her agents to
unveil string value s. Each Ais includes the prescription that each Aj should declare string value s at Qj .
We say the protocol is -sound if, when Bob honestly follows the protocol and Alice follows any Ais ∈ Ss, the probability that
all of Bob’s agents accept obeys
Prob(O1 = . . . = 0n = accept ) ≥ 1−  . (4)
We say the protocol is -secure against Alice if, whatever strategy she uses, including strategies not in any Ss,
Prob(∃j 6= j′ such that sj 6= sj′ & Oj = Oj′ = accept ) ≤  . (5)
We say the protocol is -concealing if the following condition holds. Suppose it is given that Alice will follow prescription
Ais for some given i ∈ I known to Bob and a string value s ∈ {0, 1}t of her choice, everywhere up to the unveiling points Qj ,
where Alice’s agents do not send any information. Suppose that Bob’s agents then share all the information received during the
protocol, communicating it all to a single agent B′ at some point Q′, where Q′  QJ for all j. Then B′ can learn no more than
 bits of information about Alice’s chosen string s.
As in the case of bit coordination, the protocol may allow Alice other sound and concealing strategies, including strategies in
which her agents coordinate to reveal a string that remains in a superposition state until unveiling.
A secure bit string coordination protocol
To define a secure bit coordination protocol, consider the following variant of the scheme of Ref. [23]. A secure bit string
coordination protocol may be defined simply by composing a number of these secure bit coordination protocols. Alice and Bob
agree on a space-time point P and n space-like separated points {Qi}ni=1 in the causal future of P . They each have agents,
separated in secure laboratories, adjacent to each of the points P,Q1, . . . , Qn. To simplify for the moment, we take the distances
from the labs to the relevant points as negligible. Alice may have other agents at other locations. We assume that Alice’s
agents have secure quantum and classical communication channels as required. Alice’s secure classical channels could, for
example, be created by pre-sharing one-time pads between her agent at P and those at Q0 and Q1 and sending pad-encrypted
classical signals. If necessary or desired, these pads could be periodically replenished by quantum key distribution links between
the relevant agents. Her secure quantum channels could, for example, be teleportation using pre-shared entangled states and
(not necessarily secure, but authenticated) classical communication. We assume that Bob’s agents either have secure classical
communication channels or pre-share the classical description of the qubit string used by Bob in the protocol.
Bob securely preprepares a set of qubits |ψi〉Ni=1 independently randomly chosen from the BB84 states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}
(where |±〉 = 1√
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(|0〉 ± |1〉)) and sends them to Alice to arrive (essentially) at P .
We define a strategy SP ′ for Alice to produce a coordinated unveiling of the bit value of her choice, for any point P ′ such
that P  P ′  Qi for all i. To be able to unveil 0 in strategy SP ′ , an agent of Alice’s agent at P ′ measures each state in the
{|0〉 , |1〉} basis, and sends the outcomes over secure classical channels to her agents at each of the Qi. To be able to unveil 1,
Alice’s agent at P ′ measures each state in the {|+〉 , |−〉} basis, and sends the outcomes as above.
To unveil her coordinated bit, Alice’s agents at each of the Qi reveal her measurement choices and outcomes to Bob’s agents
there. Each of Bob’s agents checks that the choices and outcomes revealed to them are statistically consistent with the qubit
string initially sent and that the choices correspond to the declared bit value. If so, they accept the revelation; if not, they reject.
For Alice to be able to successfully cheat on any coordinated bit, at least two of her agents must be able to produce measure-
ment choice and outcome data statistically consistent with measurements in the two BB84 bases on the same set of N qubits.
There are n(n− 1)/2 pairs of agents, and the probability of any pair successfully doing so [27] decreases exponentially with N .
The protocol is thus (N)-secure against Alice, where (N)→ 0 as the security parameter N →∞.
Alice gives Bob no information until unveiling, so the protocol is perfectly (i.e. 0-) concealing.
In the ideal case of perfect preparation, transmission and measurement, Alice’s results are always statistically consistent with
her declared bit value and measurement choices. The protocols is thus perfectly (i.e. 0-) sound in this case.
The protocol can also be shown to be secure and sound in the presence of non-zero errors and losses [24, 27].
Notice that, if any pair Qi and Qj are space-like separated, Alice’s successful unveiling at Qi and Qj guarantees that she was
committed to the unveiled bit, in the standard sense [22], at some point in the past of Qi and Qj . However, it does not identify
the point at which she was committed. In particular, it does not guarantee that she was committed at P .
